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This is a copy of three proposed amendments to H.R. 1, the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Bill, as presented to the Senate
Finance Committee on March 23, 1955.

H.R. 1

C01VIMITTEE ON

FINANCE

UNITED STATES SENATE

Senators Thurmond, Ervin, Sparkman, Hill, Purtell, Aiken,
PastorG, Stennis, Scott, Green, Bridges, Cotton, Payne,
Johnston (s.c.), Daniel, Smith (Me.), Flanders

A ME N D ME N T
1.

On page 4, line 13; page 6, line 20; page 6, line 22;
page 7, line 10; and page 10, line 9.
Strike out the word "July" and insert in lieu
thereof the word "January 0 •

2.

On page 4, line 14.
Strike out line 14 through line 25 on page 4 and line
1 through line 2 on page 5 and renumber clause "(iii)"
on page 5, line 3, as "(ii)"
.

J.

On page 5, line 24
Strike out the subparagraph lettered
entirety.

0

(E)" in its

MEMORANDUM ON SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS

TOH. R. 1
On March 16 several Senators representing leading textile_
producing states in New England and the Southeast met to discuss
problems of the textile industry as related to certain provisions
of H. R. 1 as passed by the House.

Three Amendments were tenta-

tively agreed upon for sponsorship by a number of Senators.
Attached on a separate sheet is specific proposed language
for the three amendments, identified as Nos. 1,2 and 3.

A brief

discussion of each amendment, and the justification for it,
follows.
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Basically, all three amendments are aimed at the same objective:
to make the bill what its proponents advertise it to be--a three year extension of the President~s authority to enter into trade
agreements, with new nower to cut existing tariff rates by up to

5 percent during each of the next three years.
l)assed by the House,

n.

Actually, as

R. 1 makes it possible to cut existing

tariff rates on cotton textiles by as much as 571 percent .

AMENDMENT NO o 1
The House bill sets July 1 , 1955, as the base date for figuring
tariff reductions under its 15 nercent duty cutting authority .
But between now and that date, rates subject to change in the
current tariff negotiations at Geneva ~ay be cut by amounts
ranging up to 50 nercent .

Some 90 percent of the cotton textile

industry 1 s nroduc,t ion is subject to possible tariff reductions
at Geneva of 50 percent .

No one knows what cotton textile tariff

rates will be on next July 1.

Other major industries are not

involved in the Geneva negotiations to a comparable extent and so
know what their tari ffs will be on July 1 and hence co.n calculo.te
the effect of H. R. 1 on them .

Amendment No . 1 is designed to

correct this inequity by changing the base dat e from July 1,

1955

to January 1 1 _~9.ii~
Al.VIENDMENT NO o 2

The provision in H.R. 1 authorizing tho President, through trade
agre ements, to cut by as much as 50 percent the tariff rates e f
January 1, 1945, on these items being im~orted not at all or in
"negligible'' quantities is vast in its scope, although little
nublicity has been given this section of the bill .

Under such

provision, for example, practically all textile tariff rates might
well fall.
1'1ho is to determine who.tis n nnegligi.ble" quantity?

And even

if this provision is strictly interpreted by the administrators
of H. R. 1, is it not quite possible, nevertheless, that a cut of
50 percent in such rates will lead to a tenfold expansion in
imnorts of the items involved?
Amendment No. 2 is designed to correct this inequity by
eliminating this provision from the bill.

-3AMENmlIENT NO •

1

The general rule in H. R. 1 grants authority to reduce existing
duties by 15 percent (5 percent per year) but an excention is
made in sub-p~ragrnph (E) of Section 3 (a}.

It authorizes the

President on and after June 12, 1955, to reduce duties by 50
percent of those existing on January 1, 1945, on those articles
which are on the list of items being negotiated with Japan at
Geneva.
The principal industry now being negotiated at Geneva is the
textile industry and, by and large, the whole 50 per cent reduction
is available.

It is unfair to segregate an industry which is

unfortunate enough to be currently on the bargaining table and
authorize a much greater c-:it in its duties than is allowed for
the rest of the American industry.
The exception goes even further, however, than merely discriminating in the amount of ;reductions.

Sub-paragraph (E) contains

a different test to guide the President.

It grants authority to

reduce rates by 50 per cent "if the President determines that such
decrease is necessarv it order to provide expanding exnort markets
for products of Japan (including such markets in third countries)".
It is apparent that the test of Sub-paragraph (E( is designed
exclusively to aid Japat without reference to the welfare of our
domestic industry and hence is contrary to the general principles
of this legislation.

As a matter of statutory construction, the

suecific controls the general .

It is patently obvious that

decreases in our duties would "provide expanding export markets
for the products of Japan."

It can also be argued that this

special test in Sub-paragraph (E) nullifies both the "escape"
and

0

peril-point" provisions of the current Act and leaves the

textile industry exposed to great damage and unemployment.
Amendment no. 3 is designed to correct this inequity by
striking the provision from the bill.
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